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Adult safeguarding often creates a tension for welfare practitioners between promoting 
an adult’s autonomy and their duty to try to protect them from harm. Literature 
highlights the dangers of adopting simplistic notions of autonomy and capacity in 
assessing whether someone may be choosing to live with harm. Yet very little has been 
published about how adults at risk and family members experience the tension between 
autonomy and protection: what choices do they think they have and why might they 
choose one above another? The article starts to address this gap by utilising an ethic of 
care to explore the experiences of an adult at risk; and then a family member where 
older people were being harmed within family relationships. These accounts were drawn 
from a Scottish qualitative adult safeguarding study. They highlight how choice, 
autonomy and capacity are interconnected concepts; and that they can be compromised 
by a range of personal, relational and environmental factors. In addition they 
demonstrate how practitioners can support or limit the choices open to adults at risk and 
their family members. The ensuing discussion summarises the implications for practice 
and considers how voices of experience might be better captured in the future.  
Key words: choice, adult safeguarding, capacity, autonomy, ethical dilemma, 
ethic of justice and ethic of care, case studies 
Introduction 
Adult safeguarding policies across the UK require practitioners to identify, investigate 
and where necessary protect an adult at risk of harm, abuse or neglect, if they are 
unable to safeguard themselves due to disability, mental health or frailty.  At the same  
time practitioners should be supporting their autonomy.  This tension between 
protective duties and supporting a person’s autonomy presents ethical dilemmas for 
practitioners.  A key challenge is trying to determine whether a person is freely choosing 
to live with harm; and one UK country has now formally introduced the concept of 
choice into their practice guidance.  The Scottish Government has advised that  a 
distinction needs to be drawn between: ‘an adult (who) is unable to safeguard 
themselves, and one who is deemed to have the skill, means or opportunity to keep 
themselves safe, but chooses not to do so’ (Scottish Government 2014,13).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Author: Kathryn Mackay is a Lecturer in Social Work at the University of Stirling. 
Correspondence to Faculty of Social Science, Colin Bell Building, University of Stirling, 
STIRLING, Scotland, FK9 4LA. Email: k.j.mackay@stir.ac.uk. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Ethics and Social Welfare on 24 
Jan 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17496535.2017.1280069
2 
 
 Choice has been adopted, by successive UK governments, as a key value to inform 
the development and implementation of social care policy. Yet choice, in this context, is 
a contested concept and there is a large body of work that critically considers its 
assumptions and limitations. For example that it fails to acknowledge the structural 
factors such as poverty, age, race and gender that give some people more choice than 
others (Clarke et al. 2007; Glendinning 2008; Stevens et al. 2011).  At the personal 
level it is criticised for depicting citizens as independent, rational and autonomous 
choice-makers; minimising the interdependent and relational nature of everyday life that 
an ethic of care seeks to highlight (Barnes 2011, Lloyd 2010).  This underlines the 
importance of exploring choice from the experience of adults at risk and their families, 
and yet their perspective forms only a small part of the adult safeguarding research 
conducted so far (Graham et al. 2014; Preston- Shoot and Cornish 2014).   
 
  The author starts to address this gap by presenting the accounts of an 
adult at risk and of a family member, who were not related to each other, and who were 
interviewed in 2011 as part of a Scottish adult safeguarding research project (Mackay et 
al. 2011).  The article first uses an ethic of care to problematize the concept of choice 
and draws upon social care and adult safeguarding research to highlight the personal 
and relational factors that may affect a person’s ability to safeguard.  Secondly an 
outline of the research methodology is provided before the personal accounts are 
presented. This leads to a discussion on how skills, means and opportunity of 
safeguarding might be usefully defined. The article’s distinctive contribution lies in the 
deeper insight it offers into adult safeguarding dilemmas and choice from the 
perspective of an adult at risk and a family  member.  
 
 
Choice, Capacity and the In/Ability to Safeguard  
 
 This section starts with an exploration of choice as a policy value and sets out the 
critique offered by an ethic of care.  It draws upon research to illustrate the persona and 
relational nature of choice from the perspective for older and disabled people. It then 
considers how such factors might also influence capacity before the emergent themes 
are brought together to try to define skills, means and opportunity in the context of adult 
safeguarding.      
 
Choice as a Policy Value 
 
The choice as a  policy value is said to be individualistic because it devolves the 
responsibility for managing risk to the citizen (Ferguson 2007).  It also assumes that 
people will make the ‘right’ or rational choice when faced with a decision regarding their 
welfare (Rabiee 2013).  Clarke and Newman (2012) argue this promotes the idea of 
responsible citizenship where those who make poor choices may be viewed as 
undeserving of state support.  It is illustrative of an ethic of justice in that it seeks to 
maintain a clear boundary, based on the principle of self-determination, between 
personal and state responsibility (Held 2006, Tronto 1993).  Choice, therefore, is not a 
neutral concept but a product of ‘ideological, cultural and political debate’ about the role 
of welfare services (Barnes 2012, 61).  The most recent changes in adult safeguarding 
law in England, Scotland and Wales provide one such example.  Whilst all three 
governments agreed that risk of, as well as actual harm or abuse, were grounds for 
investigation they imposed different thresholds.  The terms abuse or neglect were  
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adopted in Wales and England but Scotland adopted a lower threshold of harm 
(Department of Health 2014, Scottish Government 2014, Welsh Assembly 2014).  This 
means that instances of harm that might lead to intervention in Scotland may not trigger 
a safeguarding response elsewhere in the UK until they reach greater severity.   
 
  The concept of mental capacity, from an ethic of justice perspective, is key to 
maintaining the boundary between personal and state responsibility. If someone is 
assessed as having capacity they are self-determining; and, in this context, freely 
choosing to live with harm, even if that harm is severe (McDermott 2011).  Adult 
safeguarding policy does caution against inability to safeguard being equated with 
cognitive capacity (Department of Health 2014, Scottish Government 2014, Welsh 
Assembly 2014). Yet this may be difficult to achieve within the more established 
dominant discourse of choice v protection in social care policy (Barnes 2012, Cornwall 
Adult Protection Committee 2007, Fyson and Kitson 2007).  Here in/capacity sits 
alongside other binaries that place independence, autonomy, choice and control on one 
side and welfare dependency and paternalism on the other  (Fyson and Kitson 2007, 
McDermott 2011, Preston-Shoot and Cornish 2014).    
 
An ethic of care challenges such binaries arguing that a lack of independence or 
autonomy does not automatically lead to dependency.  Instead there is a need to 
‘rethink our conceptions of human nature to shift from the dilemma of autonomy or 
dependence to a more sophisticated sense of human interdependence’ (Tronto 
1993,102).  If interdependence is an everyday fact of life, then autonomy itself is 
relational: something that is nurtured, as well as constrained, by other people 
(Christman 2014, Mullin 2011, Sevenhuijsen 1998).  Barnes (2011) and Lloyd (2010) 
have therefore used the ethic of care  to highlight how UK adult care policies, such as 
personalisation, focus on the informational and practical elements of accessing and 
gaining support but fail to acknowledge the  personal and relational elements of  these 
very processes (Barnes 2011 and 2012, Lloyd 2010).  In summary then it is better to 
see choice as a process of choosing rather than as a one off event; and an important 
element of choosing may be quality of the relationships between the person and 
significant others in their life, including  professionals.   
 
Making a choice  
 
UK social care policies, as noted above, presume a person who has been given 
information about the various options will make an objective or rational choice.  A major 
UK longitudinal study of disabled people and older adults who were facing major 
decisions around medical intervention, housing or personal support challenges this 
rationalistic approach. The findings draw attention to the lack of available information 
and advice, but they also highlight the influence of identity, emotion and relationships on 
choice (Rabiee and Glendinning 2010).  
 
Firstly, in relation to identity, Rabiee (2013, 9) reported that ‘some [people] 
prioritised choices that maintained their sense of independence in the shorter term, 
even at the risk of their future independence’.  Rabiee (2013) observed some people’s 
decisions were driven not by future proofing but by the need to reinforce a sense of self 
that was being challenged by poor health and impairment. For example some people 
made choices that better preserved their identity as a parent or partner; or reflected 
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their attachment to their current home.  Secondly the study highlighted the role of 
emotion. It found that some choices were seen as so difficult that people delayed or 
avoided making a choice: ‘Most of the emotions discussed were negative, such as fear, 
worry, stress, isolation and anger…. People reported a downward spiral whereby their 
perceived difﬁculty in making decisions led to anxiety and further deteriorations in 
health.‘ (Glendinning and Baxter 2013, 443).   
 
 These personal dimensions of choice and decision-making: identity and emotion 
within the context of their close relationships are also reflected in the small body of 
safeguarding literature.  Mowlam et al. (2007) interviewed older people, within a wider 
UK study into elder abuse. The interviewees had not necessarily experienced abuse but 
their views highlight the difficulties people might experience. Firstly some interviewees 
expressed reluctance about divulging possible harm due to fear, anxiety and shame 
(Mowlam et al. 2007).   A portion of their interviewees were also concerned about the 
potential negative outcomes for their partner, or family member, if they spoke out in 
such situations.  This latter point highlights an additional dimension: that relationships 
are rarely all good or bad, and that concern for the harmer may stop people seeking 
help.  Responding to the harmer’s need might therefore also be necessary. A point that 
was made by Held (2010) in connection to domestic violence where the pursuit of 
justice through courts might not, on its own, reduce risk of harm for the victim.  
 
The reluctance to disclose harm arose also within a research project that sought 
the views of disabled people about risk (Faulkner 2012).  Some participants were 
concerned that such disclosures might be interpreted by practitioners as an inability to 
live independently.  Being seen as ‘vulnerable’ was said to threaten their own sense of 
self as someone in control of their lives.  Finally a Scottish review of available small- 
scale adult safeguarding evaluations and research projects revealed factors that 
supported or limited adults’ at risk and their family members’ participation in 
investigatory processes (Improving Participation Project Team 2013).  Of particular 
relevance to this discussion were the findings that poor mental health and anxiety 
stopped people from seeking help but also that it affected their ability to process 
information and advice given by practitioners.  
 
 This research context confirms the influence of personal and relational factors on 
decision-making about significant welfare concerns.  It suggests that choosing to live 
with harm may be influenced by the perceived threats to one’s emotional wellbeing; to 
the welfare of the harmer, and to one’s identity.  Bergeron’s (2006) observations, as a 
counsellor for older adults who experienced abuse, support these research findings. 
She suggests that the strength of such feelings, combined with poor mental health 
might lead to a person’s sense of self becoming so precarious that they feel they have 
no option but to remain in an abusive situation.  This suggests the concept of capacity, 
as well as choice, requires careful appraisal.      
 
Capacity to safeguard  
 
Changes in mental capacity law across the UK reflect the move away from 
viewing incapacity as a global condition to one that is decision-specific (Johns 2014). 
Yet decision- specific capacity assessments can suffer from the same rationality 
approach as choice: focusing on one issue at a fixed point in time (Brown 2011).  This 
could lead to a continued all or nothing approach: if someone can be said to have the 
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capacity to make a choice then they are self-determining and welfare services should 
not intervene.  McDermott’s Australian study of workers’ responses to self-neglect and 
squalor provides an example of this.  She found that some workers took a ‘strict or 
detached view of autonomy’ akin to an ethic of justice: intervention was ‘only 
appropriate when people are legally determined to lack decision-making capacity’ 
(McDermott 2011, 60). In contrast other workers demonstrated an approach based on 
an ethic of care: trying to establish a relationship with the person in the hope that 
through time and building trust some agreed changes could be made to reduce risk.  
 
Part of the problem in assessing capacity is the conflation of decisional capacity 
with executional capacity (Braye, Orr and Preston-Shoot 2011).  Decisional capacity is 
the cognitive ability to think through a problem and its possible solutions.  It can, as 
noted above, be reduced by poor mental health (Improving ASP Participation Project 
Team 2013).  In addition a person’s own life history and resulting sense of self might 
also skew their view of the issues or options for action (Brown 2011, Braye, Orr and 
Preston-Shoot 2011).   Decisional capacity can also vary across different aspects of a 
person’s life (Johns 2014).  For example a person with mild to moderate learning 
difficulties might be able to understand many practical aspects of everyday life but may 
struggle to comprehend the difference between healthy or harmful relationships (Fyson 
2009).   Executional capacity is the ability to put a choice into action. For example 
someone may be physical incapable of taking an action but they can instruct someone 
to execute it on their behalf. People may also need other types of support to put their 
decision into action such as getting safely to a place of refuge.  There are more 
challenging aspects of executional capacity to assess such as whether someone has 
enough emotional strength or a belief that change is possible with or without support; 
and whether they are under the undue influence of others not to take action (Mackay et 
al. 2012).  
 
Failure to recognise the contextual and contingent nature of capacity might lead 
to failure to see that a ‘person is genuinely out of their depth’ (Brown 2011, 195).  
Steven Hoskin, a young man with learning difficulties, who was murdered by people 
who ‘befriended‘ him may have been one such person (Fyson and Kitson 2007).  A 
range of professionals had contact with Steven and focussed on the presenting issue 
for their own agency: reports to housing about anti-social behaviour or medical staff 
treating his injuries.  Each appeared to view him as self-determining.  In contrast, the 
serious case review assessed Steven as latterly having very little choice or executional 
capacity because he was subject to coercion by others (Cornwall Adult Protection 
Committee 2007).   
 
 
Skill, Means and Opportunity to Safeguard  
 
This literature overview, drawing upon an ethic of care, highlights the need to be 
attentive to the interdependent, relational and personal nature of choosing, or not, to 
live with harm.  This suggests a broad definition of the skills, means and opportunity. 
Skills are more than cognitive capacity; and they might include the ability to 
concentrate, to think things through and self-awareness about how one’s history and 
identity might influence choices and actions.  Means extend beyond available 
information, advice and service, to personal resources such as confidence and strength 
of character.  It will also include sources of support that the person might have around 
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them.  Dictionaries define opportunity as a favourable occasion or a good chance.  In 
some ways it overlaps with means in that it could be availability of the support of friends 
and family, or the knowledge of welfare resources potentially open to them.  However it 
also speaks to the more hidden psychological aspects: a belief that change for the 
better might be possible, that they are worth the effort; and that they trust someone 
enough to believe that they will walk alongside them along an uncertain path.  In short 
this initial definition recognises the relational nature of autonomy and in this respect 
practitioners who undertake safeguarding work might be viewed as an opportunity as 




This qualitative research study (Mackay et al. 2011) sought to explore adult 
safeguarding from the perspective of social service practitioners and adults who had 
been defined as at risk of harm. Only six adults at risk agreed to participate and this led 
to the inclusion of family members, which elicited only one further participant (see next 
section for fuller discussion of this decision).  The study was funded by and conducted 
within three Scottish local authorities in 2010/11.  Ethical approval was given by the 
university and the local authorities involved.  A previous publication (Mackay et al. 
2012) explored the perceptions of the 29 practitioners, who participated in the study, on 
the impact of new Scottish adult safeguarding legislation.  It highlighted majority views 
around greater clarity of role, more priority being given to supporting adults at risk and 
improved interagency working.  It also noted that some practitioners expressed 
anxieties around assessing whether adults at risks were making informed choices and it 
was this finding that led to a secondary analysis of the other transcripts.     
 
Methodology    
 
This section focuses on the methodology for the adults at risk and the family 
member.  Adults at risk are defined as vulnerable research participants and are also a 
group who are hard to reach (Mowlam et al 2007).  A key ethical consideration was 
establishing a sample and access protocol that avoided distress and ensured informed 
consent.  This led to the decision to involve only those who had ongoing involvement 
with social services.  A manager in each agency identified potential participants and 
asked the lead worker if there were any reasons, such as illness or ongoing harm, not 
to invite the person to take part in the research.   Those not ruled out were then visited 
by their worker who explained the research with the use of an easy to read information 
sheet and consent form.  This process elicited only six service users. The decision to 
approach family members of adults at risk was taken with the aim of increasing the 
number of voices from people with experience. It was decided that these family 
members should not be related to adults at risk who had already been contacted.  
Family members were not to be seen as proxies for the adult at risk but would be asked 
to share their own views of the safeguarding process.  As noted above only one family 
member agreed to be interviewed and this may have been due to the decision being 
taken towards the end of the data collection stage. In contrast a project, to develop an 
adult safeguarding outcome measure, set out from the start to gain the views of both 
adults at risk and family members; and this produced a much better response (Norrie et 




  Each person was interviewed once to explore in general terms the support they 
received, what had been helpful or unhelpful about the safeguarding process, and what 
might have changed as a result.  There was potential for discussion about past events 
to cause emotional upset so interviewers took their cue from the interviewees and 
respected the choices they made about disclosure.  In addition the local authority had 
agreed to respond to any need for additional support if the interviewee became 




The chosen cases studies offer original insights but they have been picked from 
what was already a very small sample. Therefore no claims are made about their 
generalisability.  In addition the methodology did not set out to take a specific narrative 
approach.  Nora and Sue (pseudonyms) were selected because they gave the clearest 
account of their thoughts and feelings of an adult.  Future projects could try to avoid this 
potential bias by giving more time and planning around facilitating communication. In 
addition building in a second interview would have given both respondent and 
researcher time to reflect on their discussion and the opportunity follow up on emergent 
themes. That said the in-depth presentation of two participants’ experiences does 
provide a rich insight into choice and the in/ability to safeguard that can be built upon in 
future work. 
 
Preparing the Case Studies 
 
  The author read the interview transcripts in depth and the case studies were 
written from first contact with social work through to the time of the interview.  She 
regularly referred back to them to check that quotes were not taken out of context.  The 
aim was to give a faithful account of their experience.  The author has used quotation 
marks to denote their exact use of words. Elsewhere the author has used terms such as 
‘described’ or ‘expressed’ to denote a paraphrasing of something that came directly 
from the interviewees. All identifying features have been changed to preserve 
anonymity.  The quotations have been altered in three ways to help the reader.  
Scottish words have been placed with their English equivalent; identifying information 
has been replaced by neutral descriptions in brackets and a series of full stops signifies 
that some phrases have been removed where the interviewee was repeating 
themselves or struggling to find an expression that reflected their thoughts.   
  
 
Inability to Make a Choice 
 
Nora was in her late sixties and was not in receipt of services.  A family member 
made the referral to social work.  Nora had no physical or cognitive impairments and 
her experience demonstrates how capacity to make and then act on choices can be 
compromised in other ways.  She explained that Pete, her son, had a substance misuse 
problem and moved in with her after becoming homeless.  Nora described how he 
began to exert his will over hers till in the end he controlled many aspects of everyday 
life:   
I wasn’t allowed to open my curtains…but it was all different things. He used to 
wake me up during the night because he was coming down from the thing [a 
drug induced high]…and he would get angry    
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Nora lacked confidence: she described herself as a quiet person and ‘not forward 
enough’.  Also she did not know who to seek help from: she said she couldn’t ‘have 
went for it herself because I didn’t know what to do’.  Nora’s narrative was dominated by 
two distinct elements that stopped her addressing the harm.  The first was that poor 
mental health compromised her decision-making ability and the second was that she 
felt responsible, as a mother, for her son and felt unable to put him out because ‘he’s 
got disabilities’.  Nora was able to express her despair at the time of the safeguarding 
investigation: 
  I just felt I was in a hole and couldn’t get out…It was dreadful. And it got to the 
stage that… I just used to go to bed at night and just hope I didn’t wake up in the 
morning.  
 
The arrival of two social workers at her door posed a threat as a well as an 
opportunity: risk of aggravating her fragile mental health but at the same time the 
possibility of a way out of the harm: 
 
Although I was scared…I know it was good because I was hoping they could 
help me. It was what I wanted, somebody to help me. 
 
The next passage reveals her internal struggle between what she might be losing as 
well as gaining.  It also reflects her difficulty in processing the social workers’ 
information and advice (ASP Improvement Team 2013): 
 
I didn’t just say right I’m going…I had to think what would happen and all the 
other things were jumbling inside my head…and it was leaving my house, it was 
the thought of leaving it and then my son wasn’t going to  be there when I got 
back....They didn’t rush me or anything. I could take my time. They never made 
me decide anything quick. They would say think about it… And that’s what 
helped me…….It was marvellous (in the safe place). It was like a 
holiday…Because it got me away…I just felt I had time to think. 
 
Nora’s account suggests the practitioners recognised her dilemma and  
compromised decisional capacity.  She repeated often that they were patient and 
understanding: they were always ready to explain things and spend time with her.  They  
were also seemed aware of her inability to put wishes into action i.e. her lack of 
executional capacity (Braye, Orr and Preston-Shoot 2011). They offered a safe house 
for her and homeless accommodation to Pete: 
 
I couldn’t do that put him out on the street. And they…what they done, was put 
me in a small house for two weeks then they took my son away (to a homeless 
unit)…It made me feel guilty cos I’d put him into that.  
 
These feelings of guilt illustrate how maternal loyalties combined with poor mental 
health and her pre-existing lack of confidence impaired her ability to safeguard herself.  
Nora wanted the harm to stop but her dilemma was around not only weighing the costs 
and benefits for herself but also for her son (Mowlam et al. 2007).  Therefore the help 
offered to Pete was a key factor in tipping the balance towards a good chance to take.  
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 At the time of the research interview, more than a year later, Nora was 
continuing to receive emotional and practical support, and described herself as slowly 
becoming more confident.  Her son had his own tenancy and had been offered support 
with his own problems.  Initially Nora had not wanted to see him but later this changed 
and the social worker arranged supervised contact.  Nora now felt more in control: she 
allowed him to visit her home but he had to phone in advance: 
 I mean I can say to him, right it’s time to go …. I couldn’t do that before. 
 
The nature of their relationship had changed and this was Nora’s one source of regret: 
  Although I still see him, I love him ….but it’s… that closeness it isn’t there 
  anymore. 
 
This loss was heavily felt at times but overall the gains in her life appeared to outweigh 
this; and Nora talked positively about her future.  
 
 Independence at all Costs?  
 
Sue was a family member of Mr and Mrs Brown, an older couple.  Mrs Brown 
was in the later stages of a degenerative condition that had left her with very little 
mobility but her cognitive abilities remained unaffected.  Mrs Brown was determined to 
stay at home and Mr Brown, along with  carer workers, provided a lot of personal and 
practical support.  However Mr Brown’s increasing dependence on alcohol, sometimes 
consuming to the point of unconsciousness, led to variable care.  He would also, on 
occasion, refuse to let care workers in.  Sue was already involved in trying to improve 
the care for Mrs. Brown when there was an instance of domestic violence.   
 
Emotions were running high…I was discussing various options…I couldn’t calm 
him down and there was a fear for me about her safety.   
 
Sue called the out of hours social work service who then contacted the police.  Mrs. 
Brown was reluctant to see her husband charged and the police were reluctant to take 
an older man with health problems into custody.  
 
The onus then fell on social services to respond to the immediate risk.  Overnight care 
workers were put in till their care manager could arrange respite care.  The couple did 
not wish to be separated but agreed to go into a care home together. The care home 





 It was the worst thing I ever done, with hindsight, me and (the practitioner) have 
spoken about that, I think she panicked and I panicked… I used to mention 
respite to Mrs Brown thereafter and she would physically shake. 
 
 Sue described how she took over the running of the care package, through a 
direct payment, in an effort to improve the quality and consistency of support.  She 
continued to do this until Mr Brown became ill and died; and Mrs. Brown moved into a 
care home of her choice.  Sue recounted several incidents where care workers could 
not get access or where Mr Brown’s drinking lead her being called upon to address 
professionals’ concerns.  From Sue’s perspective the particular incident described 
above was the only time any professional raised the question of adult safeguarding.  
Sue’s ability to get into the house and her strength of character can be seen as a 
resource, or means of safeguarding, that all agencies involved drew upon: 
 
 And I think from them it was, like, it’s fine because Sue’s about and she knows 
and she can coordinate and she’ll sort that out and she’ll not let anything 
happen… 
I remember one time the GP found Mr. Brown, at eleven o’clock in the morning, 
absolutely comatose in the hall… and had phoned Home Care….. Home Care 
then phoned, I think, Social Work and…. I remember saying to  them, look, I’m 
really, really sorry but, you know, there’s three services here, all have a duty of 
care to Mrs Brown. 
 
Sue talked explicitly about choice at times during her interview: choices Mrs 
Brown made and then secondly the choices she felt she had.  Firstly Sue acknowledged 
Mrs. Brown’s capacity to choose:  
 
I know she has capacity and I know that she had choices to make but I had huge 
concerns…..and there would have been several phone calls out of hours with 
regards to…I’ve got concerns because (Mr. Brown) is unable and incapable. 
 
 The interviewer asked Sue if anything else could have been done: 
 
I have struggled with this…Who am I to make those kinds of choices for her? In 
as much as I had huge concerns …is it right for me to say, we’ll put her into 
care? … But if we had separated them what would her quality of life (have been). 
..My concern was because she had no quality of life…but then that was my 
judgement …maybe her quality of life was being with him. 
 
  Sue was an able person, she felt responsible for Mrs Brown and it was having an 
impact her life.  She felt she was left with little choice herself and she recounted what 
she once said to Mr. and Mrs. Brown after being called out: 
 
 The only people, you know, in this whole situation that have got choices is you 
two and your choices are impacting on my ability to (work and have a life of my 
own). 
 
Sue’s account included a lot of telephone contact with the workers involved 
though there was a sense that this was focussed more on responding to incidents as 
they arose.  Given the ongoing dilemmas and difficulties she experienced in trying to 
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keep Mrs Brown safe, and dealing with Mr. Brown’s challenging behaviour, the research 
directly asked Sue if the practitioner had discussed these with her. Sue replied “No”.  
She then went on to explore what she might have wanted to discuss:  
    
I would have liked to have known (about the legalisation).....for me to understand 
their methodology and mindset, you know, say, today, right, under this, because 
she’s got capability, however, what we could do, you know,….and where the 
boundaries are and where the problems are but….all I just kept on getting was 
capacity. 
 
 It is possible that the family’s decision to use direct payments which Sue then 
supervised may have led professionals to take a less proactive role: viewing Sue, as 




  Nora and Sue offer rich insights into how they experienced dilemmas around 
autonomy, harm and protection.  Nora wanted the harm to stop but did not want to 
place her son in a worse situation.  Sue wanted to respect Mrs. Brown’s wish to stay at 
home with her husband but feared she could not keep her safe.  Sue’s experience is not 
intended to be an example of harm that was not addressed in contrast to Nora’s positive 
outcomes.  Indeed Mrs Brown’s objective was staying at home as long as she could.  It 
does though demonstrate that sometimes harm cannot be avoided if an adult’s informed 
choices are to be respected (McDermott 2011, Preston-Shoot and Cornish 2014).  
Together they  powerfully highlight the range of factors, beyond cognitive capacity, that 
might lead someone to choose to live with harm; or to wish for the harm to stop but be 
unable to execute that desire. They underline that autonomy, choice and capacity are 
not inherent personal characteristics but are aspects to daily living that are constrained 
and nurtured within relationships.   
 
Nora’s and Sue’s accounts support the initial definitions offered for the skills, 
means and opportunity of ability to safeguard.  First that decision-making skills cannot 
be assessed on levels of cognitive impairment alone (Brown 2011); and that capacity is 
both decisional and executional in nature (Braye, Orr and Preston-Shoot 2011).  Sue’s 
narrative suggests that no-one felt Mrs Brown lacked decisional capacity: her wishes 
were clear as were her reasons.  In contrast Nora’s decisional capacity was 
compromised by poor mental health (Baxter and Glendinning 2013, Bergeron 2006, 
Brown 2011, Braye, Orr and Preston-Shoot 2011).  The practitioners supported Nora to 
re-gain decisional capacity: helping her to think through the potential issues and 
options.  From Nora’s viewpoint time and patience were key elements of their approach. 
Other people might need more specialist counselling or use of assistive communication 
technologies.    
 
Secondly Nora and Mrs Brown both lacked executional capacity (Braye, Orr and 
Preston-Shoot 2011) and it was the relationship with others that gave them the means 
to implement their choice. Sue was pivotal to Mrs. Brown staying at home: someone 
who organised the care and responded when there were crises.  Without such a family 
member Mrs. Brown may not have been afforded the opportunity to continue to live with 
her husband.  What may have been lacking for Sue was the recognition of her own 
dilemmas and support needs (Mullin 2010).  There is a sense that she had been left 
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with a residue, an effect recognised in practitioners who have worked with irresolvable 
dilemmas (Banks and Williams 2005).   In contrast, there were two instances within this 
study where social workers talked explicitly of arranging separate  support for parents 
when they recognised that their support for the daughter’s or son’s autonomy conflicted 
with the parents’ desire to keep them safe.  This raises questions about whether some 
ethical dilemmas are better recognised than others and whether this varies by type of 
familial relationship. 
 
Nora’s account highlights a range of practical means: information, safe house, 
respite care, home support and homeless facilities. The relationship built between her 
and the social workers appears key to Nora taking the opportunity: they helped her to 
believe that there was a good chance of a positive outcome. Nora’s account stands out 
as an example of the relationality of autonomy (Barnes 2012, Christman 2014 and 
Tronto 1993), and she continued to get support to rebuild her life.  Nora’s experience  
also underlines the value of supporting the harmer (Held 2006). The work undertaken, 
including supervised contact between an adult harmer and harmed has yet to receive 
attention within adult safeguarding literature but it was an important part of Nora’s 
narrative. It also took place within three other cases in this research. It therefore merits 
further exploration as a means to improve a person’s ability to safeguard themselves in 
the longer-term.   
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
This exploration of choice, autonomy and capacity through two voices of 
experience, confirms that choosing, or not, to safeguard oneself from harm is a complex   
phenomenon.  The accounts stress the need to get away from binary understandings 
around justice and care; in particular those around in/dependence and in/capacity.   
Assessing someone’s safeguarding ability should  not be viewed as decision-specific 
events: it is a process that may take quite a long time.   Also that these interconnected 
concepts need to be placed in the everyday context of people’s lives: their sense of self 
and motivations, emotional wellbeing, the nature of their relationships and their 
attachment to their existing homes.  Without embedding these understandings into 
practice simplistic applications of these concepts may continue.  In addition we need to 
know more about how adults at risk and their families experience and try to minimise 
harm, and what might help them when they faced with an irresolvable dilemma. The 
recommendations, therefore, focus on practice and research.  
 
  Safeguarding guidance and training might better acknowledge and engage with  
dilemmas that adults at risk and their family members may face, and with the complexity 
around assessing choice and capacity.  This also has implications for practitioners and 
those who manage them.  Practitioners may require more time to undertake 
investigations and  they need the type of supervision that promotes discussion of the 
uncertainties around ability to safeguard rather than focus on whether someone has 
cognitive capacity of not.  It has to be acknowledged that this recommendation is being 
made at a time of prolonged public service cuts. One recent safeguarding study has 
reported that some practitioners were under pressure from managers to process adult 
safeguarding investigations quickly (Preston-Shoot and Cornish 2014).   
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These two accounts reflect only a small proportion of the types of dilemmas that 
might surface in adult safeguarding.  There is a need to explore the experiences of a 
wider range of people who live in different environments, and are subject to different 
types of harm.  There is though difficulty in accessing adults at risk and their family 
members. So other methods to access this disparate group are required.  McDermott 
(2011) utilised observation in agencies to explore practitioners’ work with people who 
self-neglect.  This will not work in crisis situations, as described by Sue, where the value 
of the knowledge gained has to be balanced with the extra demands it places on 
participants at a time of stress.  However it might be possible in less difficult situations.   
An action research project could usefully explore other methods.  For example triad 
discussions between the adult at risk and the lead practitioner could be facilitated by a 
researcher or another worker. Such projects could involve other services users and 
family members as co-researchers (Improving Participation in ASP Team 2013).  
Yet this will only capture the narratives of those who have ongoing contact with 
services.  A way has to be found to seek the perspectives of people where 
investigations led to no further action or those who may not have been investigated at 
all.  Local authorities often send out surveys as part of their own auditing but get few 
responses.  Other avenues such as advocacy services, carer groups and use of social 
media may prove more fruitful avenues.  These methods are all more time consuming 
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